

# New market design options for future flexible energy systems

# Platform market pricing

## **Components and alternative**

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# designs of electricity market Juha Forsström

Increasing share of variable renewable energy sources and a larger penetration rate of smart metering in households are possible drivers towards platform market, which combines producers in need of balancing services and households able to provide balancing.

Characteristic for the two-sided platform market is the network effect: utility of group *i* depends on the participation on side *j*:

#### Elements of electricity market design

#### Generators

- A. All generators are treated the same
- B. Generators are classified
- 1) Firm / Flexible (several classes)
- 2) Inflexible / VRE (Wind, PV)

#### Markets for energy

- A. One market: Day-ahead –market plus additional shortterm components
- B. Two markets for energy, two products, two price levels
  - 1) Firm and flexible (only firm capacity, VRE with a firm back-up)
  - 2) As available (obligatory for inflexible generators, voluntary for others)
    - Regulated price at first and market-based in the future (without economic support)
    - Zero-marginal-cost options should use only one-year-fixedprice contracts as they reflect the economies of the internet

#### Securing capacity investments

- A. Reserve capacity market
- B. Capacity market (and secondary capacity market for upgrading VRE)
- C. Capacity certificate market
- D. Operating reserve demand curve and VOLL related-pricing element

#### Demand

- A. No structures/incentives for utilizing potential demand flexibility
- B. End-users not exposed to real-time price: aggregators take care of load control
- C. Incentivizing end-users to be flexible; customer classes
  - 1) Inflexible, met by flexible generation
  - 2) Flexible, met by cheper inflexible generation

#### Energy-only-market (EOM) - with supplementary features





Setting the price structure such that both sides get on board important but challenging, e.g., the profit maximizing platform mark-up decision for one side is affected by

- the own-side price elasticity,
- the mark-up set for the other side,
- the cross-side price elasticity and

EOM with a capacity certificate obligation for a supplier according to its customer base



Two-market structure with two capacity markets





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