# The power market of Russia

WP 5.3.1 Market development in Russian energy market

M.Sc. Dmitry Kuleshov Lappeenranta University of Technology Tel. +358468872138 E-mail: dmitry.kuleshov@lut.fi

## Power sector performance

- Number of power producers ~22 large generation companies
- Number of distribution companies~1 000
- Volume of consumed electrical energy ~1 023 TWh (as of 2008 year)
- Number of enterprises ~4 772 000 (26 000 of them are engaged in electricity production and distribution)
- Residential consumption ~ 117 TWh
- Total revenue ~35 000 M€

## Structure of power generation



#### GW



#### Structure of power consumption



More than a half of the total energy demand is formed by mining operations, manufacturing activity and industrial production (including production of energy, gas and water)

## Power industry restructuring

Vertically-integrated monopoly RAO "UES of Russia"

Generation

Transmission and distribution

Sale

# Sectors of competition

#### Generation:

✓ 6 Wholesale Generating Companies pool 31 power stations most of which are thermal with total installed capacity 53.9 GW

✓14 Territorial Generating Companies ingress cogeneration and hydro stations with total installed capacity 55.6 GW

✓ Concern "RosEnergoAtom" exploits 10 nuclear stations with total capacity 24.2 GW

✓ JSC "RUSHydro" runs 21 hydro stations with total installed capacity 25.5 GW

✓ JSC "Inter RAO UES" pools 4 heat stations with total capacity 1833 MW

#### Sales:

✓ Suppliers of last resort. Responsible for supplies to population. Supply of small and medium end-users mainly

✓Independent sale companies. Supply of big industrial consumers mainly

# Transmission and distribution

#### Transmission grid operator - JSC "Federal Grid Company"

 Eight subsidiaries supervising all parts of the national grid and providing services of technological connection to networks.
 Assets include 121096 km of lines and 797 substations

#### **Distribution networks operator - Holding "MRSK"**

 Responsible for running of distribution networks of the country. The Holding includes eleven interregional subcompanies each of those, in turn, comprises several regional distribution companies

# Infrastructure organizations

- ✓ System Operator
- Commercial Operator
- Federal Tariff Service
- Federal Antimonopoly Service

#### Energy and capacity markets liberalization





Source: Energy Fund Development 2008

Energy and capacity markets liberalization

#### Liberalized volumes of energy and capacity in Russia:

□ 2011-2030 years – 81%~84%

Source: General plan of the power industry development up to 2030

# Energy Market model

In place:

- Regulated trade
- Spot-market
- Balancing market
- Energy forward contracts
- Energy futures
- Market of ancillary services
- To be introduced later:
- Market of transmission rights

# Regulated contracts

#### At present:

- Still remain in the non-competitive areas of Russia
- Concluded with few generators in the wholesale market for the purposes of supplies to population

# Nodal pricing

 Used in the spot and balancing markets of energy in Russia

 Perfectly fits in the conditions of insufficient transmission capacities and very different costs of generation in different regions of the country

# What is nodal pricing?

- Nodal pricing is a method to calculate the prices of electricity and to manage network congestions. Nodal prices indicate the true costs of using the electricity system by taking into account the marginal electric energy costs, congestion costs, and the costs of losses
- High prices at nodes indicate local demand for increase of generation output or transmission capacity

# Nodal pricing in Russia (computing model)

The power system is divided into nodes (6040 nodes in the European part of Russia and 602 in Siberia). Market clearing prices are determined for each node of the system

$$\sum_{h} \left\{ \sum_{t \in h} \sum_{c} \sum_{l} c_{ct}^{l} P_{ct}(l) - \sum_{g \in I} \sum_{l} c_{gh}^{l} \sum_{t \in h} P_{gt}(l) - \sum_{g \notin I} c_{gt}^{l} P_{gt}(l) \right\} \rightarrow \max_{P_{gt}(l), Q_{gt}, P_{ct}(l), V_{j}^{t}, d_{j}^{t}}$$

# Nodal pricing (boundary conditions in computing model)

$$\sum_{i} p_{ij}^{t} + \sum_{g} P_{gt} - \sum_{c} P_{ct} = 0$$
  

$$\sum_{i} q_{ij}^{t} + \sum_{g} Q_{gt} - \sum_{c} Q_{gt}^{\max} = 0$$
  

$$p_{ij}^{t} = G_{ij} [V_{i}^{t2} - (V_{j}^{t}V_{i}^{t}/t_{ij})\cos(d_{i}^{t} - d_{j}^{t} + \alpha_{ij})] + \Omega_{ij} (V_{j}^{t}V_{i}^{t}/t_{ij})\sin(d_{i}^{t} - d_{j}^{t} + \alpha_{ij})$$
  

$$q_{ij}^{t} = \Omega_{ij} [V_{i}^{t2} - (V_{j}^{t}V_{i}^{t}/t_{ij})\cos(d_{i}^{t} - d_{j}^{t} + \alpha_{ij})] - G_{ij} (V_{j}^{t}V_{i}^{t}/t_{ij})\sin(d_{i}^{t} - d_{j}^{t} + \alpha_{ij}) - V_{i}^{t2}B_{cij}$$

$$\begin{split} P_{gt}^{\min} &\leq P_{gt} \leq P_{gt}^{\max} & 0.8 \cdot V_{j}^{\text{HOM}} \leq V_{j}^{t} \leq 1.3 \cdot V_{j}^{\text{HOM}} \\ Q_{gi}^{\min} &\leq Q_{gi} \leq Q_{gi}^{\max} & 0.5 \cdot V_{j}^{\text{HOM}} \leq V_{j}^{t} \leq 1.5 \cdot V_{j}^{\text{HOM}} \\ 0 \leq P_{ct} \leq P_{ct}^{bid} \leq P_{ct}^{\max} \end{split}$$

# Nodal pricing

#### Lagrange multipliers

 $f(x1,...,xn) \rightarrow max$ 

 $L(x1,...,xn;\lambda) = f(x1,...,xn) - \lambda g(x1,...,xn)$ 

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial x_{i}} = 0, i = 1, \dots n;$$
$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda} = 0$$



$$\sum_{i} P_{gi} - \sum_{j} P_{dj} - \sum_{l} \Delta P_{l} = 0$$

We assume that the demand is inelastic i.e. that loads submit price accepting offers only.

1-4

4-5

5-6

7-6

1 - 7

50 - 100

Lagrangian:

$$L = c^{T} \cdot \mathbf{P}_{g} + \lambda \cdot (P_{D} - u^{T} \cdot \mathbf{P}_{g}) + \mu_{L}^{T} \cdot (\mathbf{P}_{l}^{adm} - A \cdot \mathbf{P}) + v_{p}^{T} \cdot (\mathbf{P}_{g}^{adm} - \mathbf{P}_{g})$$

 $\lambda$  -price of the cheapest generator (no constraints)

- $\mu$  -reflects price increment caused by system restrictions
- $\mathcal{V}$  -reflects price increment caused by limitations in generation

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial P_g} = 0, \qquad \qquad \frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda} = 0, \qquad \qquad \frac{\partial L}{\partial \mu_L} = 0, \qquad \qquad \frac{\partial L}{\partial \nu_p} = 0$$

#### Nodal pricing (optimization with simplex $P_{g1} = 453.0 \text{ MW}_{\text{Syste}}$ algorithm) $P_2 = 30MW$ $P_{l(1-7)} \le 200MW$ $P_{g2} = 50 MW$ $P_{2} = 50MW$ $P_{4} = 40 MW$ $P_{7} = 300 \text{MW}$ $P_{5} = 45MW$ $P_{6} = 250 MW$ $P_{g7} = 211.998$ Table 2. Power flows in the system Power flows (MW) Nodal capacities (MW) Node Branch Load Power flow components Value Generation 1-2 1 0 453 1230/7 - Pg7/7 - (16 · Pg2)/21 107.3336 7 2-3 300 212 127.3336 $(5 \cdot Pg2)/21 - Pg7/7 + 1020/7$ б 250 0 3-6 77.3336 $(5 \cdot Pg2)/21 - Pg7/7 + 670/7$ 5 0 1-4 45 1265/7 - Pg7/7 - (2 · Pg2)/21 145.6670

105.6670

60.6670

111.9994

200.0014

985/7 - Pg7/7 - (2 · Pg2)/21

670/7 - Pg7/7 - (2 · Pg2)/21

 $(2 \cdot Pg7)/7 - Pg2/7 + 410/7$ 

2510/7 - (5 · Pg7)/7 - Pg2/7

4-5

5-6

7-6

1-7

0

0

50

715

4

3

2

Total

40

50

30

715

 $\sum_{i=1}^{3} P_{gi} = 715,$   $P_{g2} = 50,$   $\frac{2510}{7} - \frac{(5 \cdot P_{g7})}{7} - \frac{P_{g2}}{7} = 200$ 

Lagrangian:  $L = 100 \cdot P_{g1} + 300 \cdot P_{g2} + 150 \cdot P_{g7} + \lambda \cdot (715 - \sum_{i \in G} P_{gi}) + \mu_8 \cdot (200 - \frac{2510}{7} + \frac{(5 \cdot P_{g7})}{7} + \frac{P_{g2}}{7}) + v_2 \cdot (50 - P_{g2})$   $\Rightarrow I$ 

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial P_{g1}} = 100 - \lambda = 0, \qquad \qquad \frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda} = 715 - P_{g1} - P_{g2} - P_{g7} = 0,$$
$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial P_{g2}} = 300 - \lambda + \frac{\mu_8}{7} - \nu_2 = 0, \qquad \qquad \frac{\partial L}{\partial \mu_8} = 200 - \frac{2510}{7} + \frac{(5 \cdot P_{g7})}{7} + \frac{P_{g2}}{7} = 0,$$
$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial P_{g7}} = 150 - \lambda + \frac{5 \cdot \mu_8}{7} = 0, \qquad \qquad \frac{\partial L}{\partial \nu_2} = 50 - P_{g2} = 0$$

Values of multipliers:

$$\lambda = 100 \qquad \mu_8 = -70; \qquad v_2 = 190$$
$$\mu_L^T = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \mu_8 \end{pmatrix}$$
$$v_p^T = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & v_2 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \mu_8 \end{pmatrix}$$
$$c_n = \lambda \cdot u + v_p + A^T \cdot \mu_L$$

Nodal prices in the system:



# Nodal pricing

- Less opportunities for the generators without dominating position to exercise market power – additional loading of transmission line can be "cheaper" than activating "expensive" capacities
- Simultaneous increase of prices at several nodes by more than 30% "draws attention" of the "Federal Antimonopoly Service"
- Constant presence of production and purchase prices imbalance

## Energy market risks

Example of the average day-ahead prices of energy in UES "South" (Operation day 23.09.2010)



#### Forward contracts

 Hedge the market participants against undesirable spot price changes

- Purely financial contracts (all energy is sold and purchased in the spot)
- OTC and exchange forward contracts

OTC forwards (example)				
Reference point				
	, , ?			
Generator	- 100M	W	LOAD	
LMP=375rub/MWh	Contract p =415rub/N	rice= ⁄IWh	LMP=400rub/MWh	
Generator		Purchaser		
Gets from a purchaser: (415-400)*100=1500 rub		Transfers to (415-400)*10	a generator: 0=1500 rub	
Sales in the spot market: 375*100=37500rub		Buys in the s 400*100=400	pot-market: )00	
Total revenue: 37500+1500= <mark>39000</mark> rub		Total cost: -1500-40000	=-41500rub	

# Exchange forwards

- Counterparties: the market participants located in the same price areas
- Time horizon: weeks and months (6 months at maximum)
- Volumes in contracts : are determined by the market participants in their offers to the Exchange
- Contract price : matching of prices in counter offers
- Reference point to a contract: Hub
- Spread the risks of nodal price difference payments between the counterparties!

# Exchange forwards



Source: Commodity Exchange "ARENA" 2008

## Futures

- Highly standardised exchange-traded monthly base and peak load contracts
- Standard energy delivery rate 100 kW
- Underlying assets are the monthly average spotmarket prices in the hubs "Central" and "Ural"
- Daily mark-to-market and final spot reference settlement
- Performance bond defines on a daily basis and makes up 4-15% of the contract's cost
- A little risk of a counterparty's default

# Futures (example)



## Some conclusions

- The forwards and futures do not protect the market participants against basis risk! They serve as a mean of additional revenues or losses but barely could be used as a hedging instrument.
- Solution: market of financial transmission rights!

- Sale of capacity means obligation of a generator to produce energy in amounts sufficient to cover consumption at peak hours
- Purchase of capacity means a right of a consumer to claim readiness of generating equipment to produce power at peak hours

# Capacity market model

- Regulated contracts
- Capacity auctions
- Capacity forwards
- Long term agreements with new hydro/nuclear generation
- Capacity Delivery Agreements with new heat generation
- Contests of investment projects

Long-term auction model

- Annual competitive auctions to select capacity 4 years ahead
- "Price caps" in the areas of free power flow with restraint of competition
- Generators get payments at marginal price of auction
- 15% of generation with monopoly position and 15% of the most expensive generation do not participate in price formation

#### Capacity market Long-term auction model



Capacity market Long-term model

Reduced incentives to conclude bilateral forward contracts for capacity:

Fixed price of auction for the next 4 years

 Contracts are not allowed between the counterparties from different areas of free power flow

Capacity Delivery Agreements

- Invented by the Ministry of Economical Development to get the guaranties of new stations' construction from private generators
- Allow generators to reimburse substantial share of their investments in new capacities

#### Capacity Delivery Agreements

- Payback period: 15 year
- Guaranteed payments under an agreement during the first 10 years only
- Basic rate of return under an agreement is 14% but this value is rectified each year in accordance with IRR of the state bonds
- Penalties at a rate 25% of investments and obligation to submit the price accepting offers to auctions in case of late start-up

#### Capacity Delivery Agreements (Example)

Capacity Prices for gas generation 200 MW under an agreement

Year	Price, RUB/MW per month		
1	655540		
2	657570		
3	660040		
4	663010		
5	666520		
6	670640		
7	675430		
8	680970		
9	687340		
10	694660		
11	703020		
12	712560		
13	723450		
14	735850		
15	749970		

Approximately 4-6 times higher than capacity prices in the auctions 2008-2010 and "price caps" in 2011

Capacity market Capacity Delivery Agreements

The total volume of capacity put into operation under Capacity Delivery Agreements between 2007 and 2017 will be 30475 MW. Presumably, it will cover most of capacities deficit in the upcoming years

# Energy and Capacity Prices

- Average energy prices in 2010:
- Russia (1st Price Area) 21.7 €/MWh
- Russia (2nd Price Area) 12.5 €/MWh
- Nordpool 53.1 €/MWh
- EPEX 50.4 €/MWh

## Energy price forecast

Electricity price growth forecast in Russia (€/MWh)



Source: General plan of the power industry development up to 2030

# Capacity price forecast

Capacity price growth forecast (€/MWh\*month)



Source: General plan of the power industry development up to 2030

## Thank you for attention!